

The Dutch Archives and Maguindanao History in the 18th Century

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ABSTRACT

The historical study of the southern Philippine sultanates in general and of early modern Maguindanao in particular remains a frontier in Philippine historiography. The use of European-language sources, mainly Spanish accounts, is indispensable in writing such history notwithstanding the inherent prejudices they often carry. This essay attempts to extract a Maguindanao-centric history from the less consulted archives of the Dutch East India Company (*Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*, or VOC). It aims to describe the nature of these

archives and to understand Dutch-Maguindanao interaction within the context of their different but intersecting political cultures. It focuses on two key episodes in the early decades of the 18th century to illustrate the possibility of rescuing the “autonomous” history of Maguindanao using Dutch documents in conjunction with the more known Spanish archives. It shows hitherto under-recognized Maguindanao agency in the narratives relating to the 1718 Spanish return to Zamboanga and the 1733 capture of the Dutch sailing vessel *Langerak*.

KEYWORDS

Archives, Dutch East India Company, Maguindanao, Zamboanga, Spanish colonialism

INTRODUCTION

Historical sources in the Dutch language which relate to Maguindanao in the 18th century remain largely unmapped and underutilized. These sources offer the promise of shedding light on aspects of Maguindanao history that the more known contemporaneous Spanish sources fail to record. However, since these documents were written by and for the consumption of European administrators, reconstructing an “autonomous” history becomes a challenge. This essay aims to understand the Dutch archives relating to Maguindanao by “reading against and along the archival grain.”¹ Its aim is three-fold: to understand the nature of these Dutch archives, to

illustrate the intersection of Maguindanao and European political interests during the period, and to integrate the Dutch sources with better known ones in order to reconstruct a history that foregrounds the Maguindanao agency. It focuses on the first decades of the early 18th century when both the Spanish and the Dutch resumed active involvement in the affairs of the region.²

THE DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANY (VOC) ARCHIVES

The physical documents relating to early modern Maguindanao in the Dutch archives are primarily found at the Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI) in Jakarta, Indonesia and at the Nationaal Archief (NA) in The Hague, The Netherlands. In Jakarta, these documents are mainly interspersed within two collections: Arsip Menado (1677-1914) and Arsip Ternate (1667-1908).³ However, some of the documents in these collections ended up in the capital Batavia and formed part of the Governor-General's and his council's archives (*Hoge Regering*).⁴ These documents have been recently digitized and uploaded online.⁵ Meanwhile, the documents in The Hague are part of the more accessible collection of the VOC catalogued according to which commercial chamber (*kamer*) the documents were sent (the extant ones being Amsterdam and Zeeland).⁶ These archives are likewise accessible online and are searchable through two platforms: the TANAP project website⁷ and the Nationaal Archief itself.⁸

The letters sent by the Maguindanao rulers, as with the letters sent by other local rulers to the Company, were

translated (into Dutch) and attached in the minutes of the periodic meetings of the Company's political council (*raad van politie*) in one of its main outposts in Ternate. Some of the Maguindanao rulers' letters were sent via itinerant Chinese traders who often served as Maguindanao's *de facto* letter carriers.⁹ Others were handed directly to the Dutch whenever they sent "commercial" voyages to Maguindanao, while others passed through the Company's outposts in north Sulawesi (Manado). In contrast to some of the Maguindanao letters which were preserved in their original in the Spanish archives,¹⁰ the ones found in the Dutch archives were all copies. However, such translations did not preclude the percolations of historical cultural practices especially relating to regional diplomacy. For example, the Maguindanao ruler Bayan ul-Anwar (r. 1702-1736) gifted the local Dutch functionary in north Sulawesi (likely ornamental) curtains (*tabir*) in addition to wax and tobacco. Meanwhile, the Dutch local post sent a piece of *tulus* (traditional headgear to protect one from sun and rain) as a "sign of friendship" while the chief of Bolaang-Mongondow sent pieces of *t'nalak* (abaca cloth) and Chinese-made textiles to the *raja muda* (heir apparent) Manamir.¹¹ Such exchanges require further investigation into the archives and are beyond the purview of the current essay.

Documents emanating from the Dutch side were produced at four levels: (1) the local outpost in north Sulawesi (Manado or the Sangir archipelago), (2) the regional outpost in Ternate, (3) the Governor-General and his council's office in Batavia (Jakarta), and (4) the Gentleman XVII (*Heeren Zeventien*), the highest-decision



Figure A
Map of Maguindanao and surrounding region (map by author)

making body of the Company in Amsterdam.¹² While the accessible archives in The Hague contain most of these letters from Batavia and Ternate, the archives in Jakarta house documents from Ternate which were not sent to The Netherlands, for a variety of reasons, notably because they were not deemed important for the high-ranking VOC officials to know. Whereas the documents in The Hague may provide a wider perspective of the VOC engagement with Maguindanao, the Jakarta archives may yield finer details regarding Dutch-Maguindanao interaction.¹³

Aside from these archives, other published primary sources are available. They notably include the *Generale Missiven*¹⁴ or the general missives of the Governors-General in Batavia to the Company directors in The Netherlands as

well as the *Dagh-Register te Batavia* or the daily journal of the fort of Batavia.¹⁵ The former in particular contains rich information on the Magindanao sultanate in relation to the string of islands between North Sulawesi and Mindanao, an area with which the Company maintained close economic and political ties.

Cesar Adib Majul's *Muslims in the Philippines* (1973)¹⁶ has recognized the importance of Dutch sources on the history of Mindanao. But as Ruurdje Laarhoven notes in her pioneering *Triumph of Moro Diplomacy* (1989), "although Majul claims to have consulted Dutch sources in his research on the Islamic groups in the Southern Philippines, he only scratched the surface."¹⁷ More recently, Shinzo Hayase reconstructs the early history of Maguindanao in the first three chapters of his *Mindanao Ethnohistory Beyond Nations: Maguindanao, Sangir and Bagobo Societies in East Maritime Southeast Asia* (2007), using the works of Laarhoven and Majul.¹⁸ Quite unlike its surrounding regions, Maguindanao is largely missing in the missionary (Protestant or Catholic) records throughout much of the 18th century.¹⁹ This situation only places greater importance on the Company records as a supplement to the more familiar Spanish archives. To understand the social context of these archives on Maguindanao, a brief discussion on Maguindanao politics is in order.

THE MAGUINDANAO CONTEXT

When historical documents mention "Maguindanao" or more often as "Mangindano" in Dutch sources, they evoke an image of European-style kingdom with a fixed

urban center and clearly defined boundaries. Such an image, however, does not correspond with what the Company functionaries themselves had observed or noted.



Figure B²⁰

Grote optocht ter gelegenheid van de aankomst van kapitein Charles Swan op Mindanao, Caspar Luyken, 1698

(Grand procession on the occasion of the arrival in Mindanao of Captain Charles Swan, Caspar Luyken, 1698)

While Company functionaries were likely familiar with the place called “Slangan” as the site of the Sultan’s residence along the northern arm of the Pulangi river and from which many of the letters from the Maguindanao sultans to the Company were signed, other lesser known places intermittently appear in the records. Sultan Kudarat (r. 1619-1671) was known to have transferred his capital from the Pulangi to Lamitan (present-day Baras, Lanao del Sur).²¹ Sultan Kuda (r. 1699-1702) was forced to transfer from the Pulangi to Simuay river.²² Sultan Bayan was known “to hold court in Slangan but was often in

Sibugay.”²³ In his later years, Bayan retreated from his court in downriver Slangan to upriver Kabuntalan.²⁴ Raja Muda (later, Sultan) Jafar Sadiq Manamir (r. 1710-1733) established a competing capital in Tamontaka along the southern arm of the Pulangi in 1710.²⁵ If the Maguindanao sultans had traditionally resided in Slangan and transferred capital to as geographically disparate sites as Sibugay, Kabuntalan, Simuay, and Tamontaka, then where or what exactly is Maguindanao?

Nowadays scholars define Maguindanao either as a polity, people or region. More concretely, it is used to identify an ethno-linguistic group²⁶ or as a cross between an ethnic and geopolitical category.²⁷ But Majul’s definition in *Muslims in the Philippines* stands out:

In its widest sense, the term “maguindanao” refers to all the Islamized peoples living in the valley of the Pulangi and its immediate area. It includes, therefore, the inhabitants around the northern and southern (Tamontaka) branches of the Pulangi as well as those in the upper valley where Buayan (16 miles southeast from the fork where the Pulangi divides into its two branches) was to be found. But in a more restricted and accurate sense, the term refers to a particular family or dynasty that was Iranun in origin and must therefore be distinguished from the family that ruled Buayan.²⁸

Whereas Majul’s first definition is based on broad geography and religious affiliation, the second is on status and lineage. Majul’s second definition—Maguindanao as

lineage—deserves further examination. One might be able to locate the original home of the Maguindanao descent line from Najeeb Saleeby's definition of "Maguindanao" as "limited to the old district or town of Cotabato proper"²⁹ or where the rivers Matampay and Pulangi converge. If one examines the Maguindanao *tarsila* (royal genealogies), it is instructive that marriages between a member of the ruling elite of Maguindanao and an individual from another lineage or locality mentions the provenance of that other individual even if the settlement is very close to the old district or the "Maguindanao proper." For instance, it is recorded that "Raja Muda Mangindra of Maguindanao married Mayung, a Binilwan lady..."³⁰ The place "Binilwan" (present-day Biniruan, Cotabato) is considered distinct from "Maguindanao" at that time (mid-18th century) even if Binilwan and Maguindanao are less than a kilometer apart.

For a sultan, the place of residence is less important than the claim of descent from the exclusive Maguindanao lineage-locality. The originary meaning of "Maguindanao" as a nexus of lineage and locality functions to narrow the pool of individuals who could legitimately be considered as heirs to paramount rulership. The *tarsila* serves to reify such distinction of the favored lineage (the *barabangsa*)³¹ and to acknowledge the incorporation of neighboring lineage-locality into the "Maguindanao" polity by virtue of marriage. This mechanism protects the emergent polity from the possible usurpation by non-*barabangsa* individuals who are able to gain wealth or following. An example of such an ambitious individual was a chief named Sumalog whose armed personal followers included raided Christian

indios.³² Sumalog not only was an enemy of the Spaniards, but also of the sultan of Maguindanao.

Although perhaps more virulent than the extra-lineage threat was the intra-lineage competition. Within the *barabangsa*, a complex web of marriage alliances—and factions—were formed. In order to extend influence externally and to increase prestige at home, one faction might seek marriage alliances overseas. This was the impetus for the desire of the Maguindanao prince Tubu-tubu to marry one of the daughters of Sultan Toloko (r. 1692-1714) of Ternate sometime in 1707.³³ But Tubu-tubu's proposal was denied by the Sultan of Ternate likely upon the advice of the Company. Intense competition also explains the marriage alliances of Maguindanao with the elite families of neighboring Sangir archipelago.³⁴ Sultan Barahaman (r. 1678-1699) strategically married Mafira Basing of Tabukan, the most important Sangirese polity at the time. Familial factionalism within the Maguindanao was so salient in the early 18th century that it is easier to identify a Maguindanao-Sulu-Buayan alliance under Sultan Bayan and a Maguindanao-Spanish-Sangirese one under Manamir than a single Maguindanao political entity.

THE DUTCH CONTEXT

Dutch relations with Maguindanao was underpinned by the interest to protect the spice monopoly from possible competitors—the Spanish and the English.³⁵ Maguindanao's immediate southern islands had long been considered by the Company as the “extrememost corner

of the Spice Islands”³⁶ and therefore had to be defended. Aside from spices, the Company was also interested in the rumored large quantities of gold in the region.³⁷

From 1688-1705, the Company sent regular missions to Maguindanao. These costly missions were meant to facilitate commercial relations with Maguindanao where the Company acquired substantial amounts of beeswax and tortoise shells and to ensure that no “illicit” spice trade occurred through the northern passage via Maguindanao and Sulu. Each of these Company missions to Maguindanao kept a detailed journal which often contains a description of the local political and economic situation of Maguindanao. After the cessation of these missions in 1705, the contact between the VOC and Maguindanao was maintained mainly through the irregular letter-exchange between the Maguindanao sultan and the Dutch Governor at Ternate. The series of voyages sent by the Company’s Ternate outpost between 1686 to 1705 to Maguindanao failed to make sufficient profit, which thus discouraged the sending of future voyages.

Unlike the indigenous polities with which Maguindanao had previous interaction, alliance-making with the Company did not involve elaborate marriages seemingly replaced by the periodic sending of envoys and the proliferation of missive writing. But even within this formalized and textualized form of communication, there was a conspicuous use of familial metaphors (“older/younger brother”) as forms of address seemingly to “soften” relationships. In reality however, the Company and the

Maguindanaos were often suspicious of each other. Over time the Company endeavored and succeeded at cutting off Maguindanao from its traditional connections with north Sulawesi and other Malukan polities.

By 1670s, most of north Sulawesi had effectively come under Company control.³⁸ Its rulers and chiefly families converted to Protestant Christianity as part of the contract of vassalage with the Company creating an invidious religious divide between Muslim Maguindanao and Christian north Sulawesi.³⁹ In addition, the contract of subjugation signed by the north Sulawesi chiefs stated explicitly the prohibition to interact with Maguindanao.⁴⁰ Such political shift is reflected in the local genealogies of Maguindanao and north Sulawesi polities—there were no celebrated chiefly marriages between the two regions in the 18th century.⁴¹

The Company repeatedly reminded its functionaries that no Maguindanao vessels should be allowed to trade in any of its north Sulawesi dependencies. All Maguindanao vessels had to undertake the arduous and more expensive journey to Ternate—the only port where they could trade.⁴² These restrictions adversely impacted but did not entirely eliminate Maguindanao's overseas connections. The Maguindanaos adjusted to the monopolistic Company system even as they maintained close social relations with the local ruling elites of north Sulawesi and Maluku with whom they had deeper familiarity. In what ways did Maguindanao's internal politics intersect with Spanish and Dutch commercial and political agendas?

SPANISH RETURN TO ZAMBOANGA

There is a tendency in the historical literature to view the Spanish return to their former fort in Zamboanga in 1718 as occasioning almost immediately the political decline of Maguindanao. Meanwhile, the decades of Spanish absence in Zamboanga (1663-1718) is believed to have been a period of extraordinary fluorescence of both Sulu and Maguindanao as Horacio de la Costa describes:

[T]he Magindanaus and Sulus had made considerable advances in the direction of centralized government. The semi-feudal confederacies [...] were now full-fledged sultanates with a fiscal administration, courts of justice, and a bureaucracy of a rudimentary kind. Internal disturbances were still possible and frequently occurred, but they were not so much contests between barons of roughly equal power as struggles for a throne admittedly supreme.⁴³

But to view the 1718 return as an immediate turnaround of Maguindanao fortunes in favor of the Spanish is not only an over-estimation of Spanish military strength but also a disregard to the equally important agency of Maguindanao political actors.

There were already plans to reinstate the Zamboanga fort as early as the 1680s.⁴⁴ As with the construction of the Spanish fort in Calamianes in the early 18th century, the re-establishment of the Zamboanga fort likely included not only financial considerations but also possible reactions from the neighboring Dutch rivals.

Zamboanga was well-positioned along a passage used by maritime sojourners from Sulu and Maguindanao on their way to the coasts of Spanish Philippines. It was abandoned by the Spanish in 1663⁴⁵ alongside their settlements in Maluku (Ternate) to consolidate their forces in Luzon for the rumored impending attack of the Chinese “pirate” Coxinga (Cheng Ch’eng-kung).⁴⁶ The actual re-occupation occurred, as nervously told by Maguindanao envoys to the Dutch, with the arrival of more than a hundred vessels⁴⁷ under the Spanish commander Gregorio de Padilla y Escalante.

The first years of the re-occupation of the Zamboanga were marked by intermittent military sieges led by Maguindanao and especially Maranao and Sulu chiefs.⁴⁸ Adding more trouble to the Spanish were the repeated threats of invasion of the already existing forts of Cagayan and Iligan by the Maranaos and Maguindanaos via a land route.⁴⁹ Balasi, the Iranun chief of Sabanilla (Malabang), led a daring siege of Zamboanga in late 1720 with around 300 Maranao men.⁵⁰ Balasi and his men were repelled by the Spanish but were almost successful in entering the gates of the fort.

In contrast to de la Costa’s image of decline, the return of the Spaniards to Zamboanga unleashed unprecedented diplomatic fervor among the Maguindanao and Sulu rulers. In 1720, Sulu sent its Datu Bendahara to Batavia to request for Dutch support against the Spaniards.⁵¹ The Dutch encouraged Sulu to continue such visits and re-establish their “friendship” which had been “inactive for a long time.”⁵² In 1725, the Sulu sultan requested large

cannons from the Company in exchange for lavish gifts which included 16 slaves, various kinds of pearl, edible bird's nest, jars of camphor oil and tortoise shells.⁵³ Meanwhile in Maguindanao, Sultan Bayan dispatched an envoy in 1719 to the Dutch in Semarang to likewise seek support.⁵⁴ His archrival, raja muda Manamir, also sent an envoy to Semarang with the more explicit intention of borrowing 500 rix-dollars from the Dutch likely to purchase war materiel.⁵⁵

In Maguindanao, the Spaniards indeed had exacerbated the existing familial divide between Sultan Bayan and his half-brother raja muda Manamir within a decade of their return. In 1726, the combined forces of Sultan Bayan and the peoples of Buayan besieged Manamir's capital at Tamontaka. The attack took place shortly after Manamir's contentious recognition as "Sultan of Maguindanao" by the Spaniards.⁵⁶

But Manamir's alliance with Zamboanga was not a predetermined outcome of the Spanish return to Zamboanga. Sultan Bayan himself initially showed willingness to cooperate with the Spaniards to consolidate power within his realm.⁵⁷ Bayan readily accorded permission to the Spaniards to punish one of their enemies, a Sulu chief named Balaogan, living within Bayan's realm.⁵⁸ Bayan also provided the Spaniards critical information on Balasi's plan to besiege Zamboanga. He also sent vessels and manpower including some of his most trusted aides to neutralize the ambitious plan of the Iranuns of Sabanilla to occupy Zamboanga.

The immediate debilitating impact of Zamboanga to Maguindanao can also be questioned by pointing out the seemingly heightened Islamic consciousness that united the peoples against the Spanish. Rumors were rife that Balasi's impending attack of Zamboanga was inspired by Islamic zeal.⁵⁹ Meanwhile, Sultan Bayan enjoined his subjects to donate alms for the poor and for the Islamic teachers (*pandita*). It was noted that while there was widespread distrust towards the Spaniards, there was none towards the Muslim Makassarese who come to Maguindanao to trade.⁶⁰

Throughout the 1720s, sensitive information filtered through different channels from Maguindanao to the Company domains. The information came from various quarters including Manamir himself who continuously sent envoys to the Dutch despite the ostensible backing from the Spanish.⁶¹ It was very likely that Manamir was courting the Dutch to remain neutral and to inhibit from supporting his brother Sulan Bayan. For his part, Sultan Bayan fed rumors to the Dutch that the Spanish had been purchasing large quantities (500-600 pikuls) of cinnamon from Maguindanao and that the Spanish plan to re-occupy the Sangir archipelago. This information incited alarm and suspicion from the Dutch.⁶²

THE *LANGERAK* AFFAIR

In 1733, the Dutch role in the affairs in Maguindanao took a dramatic turn. The Company brigantine *Langerak* was attacked and captured by the Spanish while anchored in the Maguindanao royal court (Slangan). The *Langerak*'s presence in Maguindanao raised suspicions among the

Spanish that the Dutch intended to take sides in the raging bloody contest for supremacy between Spanish-backed Manamir and Sulu-supported Sultan Bayan. The Spanish suspected further that the Dutch aimed at capturing the entire Mindanao island possibly with the help of friendly Muslim chiefs and even of the Japanese.⁶³ What were the real intentions of the Dutch?

The existing historical works point to Dutch fears of competition with the newly established *La Real Compañía de Filipinas* (Royal Company of the Philippines).⁶⁴ They also ultimately indicate high-level European sources as impetus for the Dutch decision to send to Mindanao not only the *Langerak* but also the frigates *Spieringshoek* and *Binnenwijsent* and the *pencalang de Bonneratte*.⁶⁵ However, a closer examination of the VOC records reveals that Sultan Bayan had been feeding information—sometimes unverified and exaggerated—to the Dutch on the supposed Spanish expansionist ambitions in Sangir and Sulawesi⁶⁶ as well as the alleged large-scale export of cinnamon by the Spanish from Mindanao.⁶⁷ By doing so, Bayan was likely hoping for Dutch support for him and antagonism for his pro-Spanish rival Manamir.

The sending of *Langerak* in 1733 was the first Company visit to Maguindanao in 27 years. The last mission was carried out by Jacob de Cloek and Nicolaas Ploos van Amstel in 1705 to ascertain that no foreigners—English in particular—were present in the jealously guarded greater Maluku region. While the *Langerak* was to visit the court of Maguindanao and to present gifts to both “Sultan and the *raja muda*,” the *De Bonneratte* was tasked to erect

markers (*merkpilaaren*) in the Sarangani islands as a sign of Dutch sovereignty over the region.⁶⁸ The *Langerak* would pretend that its sole reason for visiting was to trade iron and textiles for wax and to encourage the Maguindanao sultan to send trade missions to Ternate.⁶⁹ In reality its mandate was to investigate “the condition of the Spanish, their ships and military strength and their commerce.”⁷⁰ Therefore, in contrast to what the Spanish believed of grand Dutch designs on the island of Mindanao, the Company seemed to have simply acted only to the information sent by Sultan Bayan on Spanish ambitions in Sangir and on trade in spices.

The arrival of the *Langerak* in Maguindanao in October 1733 came at a most inopportune moment. Earlier in March, Sultan Bayan and his son Malinog had descended to Tamontaka with 700 warriors and killed Manamir.⁷¹ The murder of Manamir was seen as a revenge for the Spanish expedition against the Sultan Bayan in 1731 in which “the Spaniards attacked a few fortified places, burned a couple of settlements, and destroyed some granaries and plantations.”⁷²

While anchored in Sultan Bayan’s court in Slangan, the *Langerak* was attacked by a Spanish galley which fired a volley of cannon shots. The next day, the Spanish galley returned accompanied by a *kora-kora* (caracoa) as well as numerous prahu (smaller vessels) from the court of the late Manamir in Tamontaka.⁷³ Hamza, the son of the murdered Manamir had summoned the Spaniards in Zamboanga who in turn immediately dispatched the galley. According to Sultan Bayan, he was not able to defend the *Langerak*

against the Spanish and Tamontaka because he had no large vessels at his disposal⁷⁴ likely because of his isolation in upland Kabuntalan and Buayan following his retreat to the uplands in 1731.⁷⁵

The Dutch crew of *Langerak*, 30 of whom were sailors and 20 were soldiers, were captured and ended ultimately in Manila as prisoners-of-war. The *Langerak* and its cargo were confiscated by the Spaniards as booty. It was not only until 1735 that the Company sent a small but formidable squadron to Manila to demand the release of its imprisoned servants and the payment for the loss of the *Langerak*. The Spaniards accused the Company of meddling into the affairs of Maguindanao, while the Company claimed that Sultan Bayan was an “old friend” and that they had two letters, one for Sultan Bayan and another for Manamir, which proved that they did not intend to favor a faction.⁷⁶

The *Langerak* case illustrates that despite the declared “neutrality” of the Company, it was possible for the competing rulers of Maguindanao to utilize powerful foreign actors to their own advantages. Unfortunately for Sultan Bayan and his son Malinog, the events of 1733 only strengthened the Spanish conviction of another direct assault in the Maguindanao heartlands. With a combined Spanish-Filipino force and supported by the Tamontaka court, the Spanish occupied Slangan and aimed to attack upland Kabuntalan—key to the supply lines of Sultan Bayan with the Maranaos.⁷⁷ In one instance alone, Malinog’s faction was reported to have lost 30 women due to Spanish bombing during the siege of Slangan.⁷⁸ While the Spanish expedition of 1734 was widely considered as

having little success,⁷⁹ it displayed unquestionable Spanish military might in Maguindanao which served to buttress the authority of Manamir's descendants for decades to come.

CONCLUSION

This essay examines aspects of Maguindanao history in the early 18th century through hitherto under-utilized archival sources. It highlights the active agency of Maguindanao individuals in the making of their polity. It juxtaposes the Maguindanao political context, marked by intense familial competition, alongside the often overlapping Dutch and Spanish commercial and political interests in the region. It reveals that Maguindanao voices shaped the events of the 1720s in ways that have not been emphasized in the historical literature. While the 1718 return of the Spanish in Zamboanga served to curb the autonomous development of Maguindanao in the long-term, it did not immediately cause the decline of Maguindanao as illustrated, among others, by Maguindanao's (and Sulu's) active diplomacy with the Dutch. Finally, this essay suggests that Sultan Bayan's political maneuvering to defeat the Spanish-Tamontaka faction was likely an under-recognized factor in the fateful sending of *Langerak* in 1733.

NOTES

- 1 Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).

- 2 The Spanish were absent in Zamboanga from 1663 to 1718.
- 3 See the respective catalogs entitled, “Arsip Residensi Menado” and “Arsip Residensi Ternate,” ANRI Jakarta.
- 4 See Louisa Balk, Frans van Dijk, Diederick J. Kortlang, and Pieter Koenders. *The Archives of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and the Local Institutions in Batavia (Jakarta) = Arsip-Arsip Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) dan Lembaga-Lembaga Pemerintahan Kota Batavia (Jakarta) = De archieven van de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) en de locale instellingen te Batavia (Jakarta)*. (Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia and Leiden: Brill, 2007).
- 5 See the project called “Sejarah Nusantara” hosted by the ANRI Jakarta. <https://www.sejarah-nusantara.anri.go.id/> (Accessed 15 October 2019).
- 6 M. A. P. Roelofs, Remco Raben, H. Spijkerman, F. S. Gaastra, and Eerste Afdeling Algemeen Rijksarchief, *De Archieven van de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie = the Archives of the Dutch East India Company: (1602-1795)* ('s-Gravenhage: Sdu Uitgeverij, 1992).
- 7 TANAP or “Towards a New Age of Partnership” is an academic project-based funded by the Dutch government to facilitate the use of early modern Dutch-language archives for historical research. See <http://databases.tanap.net/vocrecords/> (Accessed 10 November 2019). Its website does not contain actual sources but merely serves as a search platform.
- 8 See <https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/en> (Accessed 10 November 2019).
- 9 See references in Ruurdje Laarhoven, “Letter from Sultan Kuda of Manguindanao (r. 1699-1702) concerning the trading activities of Chinese nakhoda and the need for military support, 21 July 1700,” in *Harta Karun: Hidden Treasures on Indonesian and Asian-European History from the VOC Archives in Jakarta* (Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 2014).

- 10 Some of them have been partly transcribed and translated. See Annabel Teh Gallop, "A Jawi Sourcebook for the Study of Malay Paleography and Orthography," *Indonesia and the Malay World* 43, no. 125 (2015): 13–171.
- 11 Nationaal Archief (NA) VOC inv. 1.04.02, no. 8076 (Ternate), 73–76.
- 12 For a general overview of the Company bureaucracy, see Els M. Jacobs, *Merchant in Asia: The Trade of the Dutch East India Company During the Eighteenth Century* (Leiden: CNWS Publications, 2006) and F. S. Gaastra, *The Dutch East India Company: Expansion and Decline* (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2003).
- 13 Most notable among such documents not found in The Hague are the so-called "Positive ordres" or excerpts from the letters of the Batavia authorities to the regional offices of the Company in Ambon, Banda, Ternate, and Makassar. See for instance the Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI) bundles from Arsip Ternate, no. 62, Positive Ordres, 1637–1739; ANRI Arsip Ternate, no. 63, Positive Ordres, 1749–1769 and ANRI Arsip Ternate, no. 63, Positive Ordres, 1759–1764.
- 14 The most relevant are volumes VI–XIII (Deel VI: 1698–1713; Deel VII: 1713–1725; Deel VIII: 1725–1729; Deel IX: 1729–1737; Deel X: 1737–1743; Deel XI: 1743–1750; Deel XII: 1750–1755; Deel XIII: 1756–1761). *Generale missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der verenigde Oost-indische Compagnie*. 13 vols., edited by W. Ph. Coolhaas, J. van Goor, J.E. Schooneveld-Oosterling (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960–2004).
- 15 *Dagh-Register gehouden int casteel Batavia vant passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlands-India Anno ...* ('s-Gravenhage and Batavia: Nijhoff and Landsdrukkerij, 1887–1931).
- 16 Cesar Adib Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines*. Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1973.

- 17 Ruurdje Laarhoven, *The Triumph of Moro Diplomacy: The Maguindanao Sultanate in the 17th century*, (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1989), xv.
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- ³⁶ NA VOC inv. 1.04.02, no. 3652 (Ternate), 8.
- ³⁷ NA VOC inv. 1.04.02, no. 8069 (Ternate), *Memorie dienende tot instructie voor den ondercoopman en secretaris Pieter Alsteijn en vaandrig David Haak*, 131.
- ³⁸ See David Henley, "A Superabundance of Centers: Ternate and the Contest for North Sulawesi." *Cakalele* 4 (1993): 39–60.
- ³⁹ There had been conversions to Catholicism in north Sulawesi during the previous Spanish period but they were more limited. Jean-Nöel Sánchez Pons, "Misión y Dimisión: Las Molucas en el siglo XVII entre Jesuitas Portugueses y Españoles," in *Jesuitas e Imperios de Ultramar siglos XVI-XX*, edited by Alexander Coello, Javier Burrieza, and Doris Moreno, 81–102. Madrid: Silex, 2012.
- ⁴⁰ ANRI Arsip Manado, inv. 65, no. 1, Contract with the Regent [Pangulu] Marcus Manoppo, 30 October 1733.
- ⁴¹ Some of the chieftains of Manganitu (a polity in Sangir) who attempted to establish marriage ties with Maguindanao were condemned by their fellow Sangirese chiefs. For the genealogies, see Shinzo Hayase, Domingo M. Non and Alex J. Ulaen (comp.), *Silsilas/Tarsilas (Genealogies) and Historical Narratives in Sarangani Bay and Davao Gulf Regions, South Mindanao, Philippines, and Sangihe-Talaud Islands, North Sulawesi, Indonesia* (Kyoto: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, 1999). For the story of Manganitu, see Lopez, "Kinship, Islam, and Raiding in Maguindanao, c. 1760–1780," 88–98.
- ⁴² ANRI Arsip Ternate, inv. 62, Positive Ordres: Ternate, 20 November 1637–27 February 1739, Magindanauw.
- ⁴³ Horacio de la Costa, *Jesuits in the Philippines, 1581-1768* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), 541, cited in Laarhoven, *Triumph of Moro Diplomacy*, xvi; see also Majul's similar view on Maguindanao decline in Laarhoven, *Triumph of Moro Diplomacy*, 175.

- 44 AGI Filipinas, 331, L.9, F.25V, Real cedula a Fausto Cruzat y Gongora, gobernador de Filipinas, para que observe las ordenes dadas sobre el presidio de Zamboanga y el mantemiento de la paz con los reinos circunvecinos... [1690].
- 45 See Manuel Lobato, "From European-Asian Conflict to Cultural Heritage: Identification of Portuguese and Spanish Forts on Ternate and Tidore Islands," in *Culture and Identity in the Luso-Asian World: Tenacities and Plasticities. Portuguese and Luso-Asian Legacies in Southeast Asia*, edited by Laura Jarnagin, vol 2, 179–207 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012).
- 46 On Coxinga, see Wei-chung Cheng, *War, Trade and Piracy in the China Seas, 1622-1683* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013).
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- 53 NA VOC inv. 1.04.02, no. 8093 (Ternate), 253.
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- ⁵⁶ NA VOC inv. 1.04.02, 8087 (Ternate), 354. See Lopez, “An exploration into the political background of the Maguindanao ‘piracy’ in the early eighteenth century”, 117, n. 66.
- ⁵⁷ AGI Escribanía 423B, Letter from Sultan Bayan to Governor Amorena, 15 October 1720.
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- ⁶² ANRI Arsip Ternate, inv. 62, Positive Ordres: Ternate, 20 November 1637–27 February 1739.
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- ⁶⁴ María Lourdes Spínola Diaz-Trechuelo, *La Real Compañía de Filipinas* (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos de Sevilla, 1965), 5–6.
- ⁶⁵ E. C. Godee Molsbergen, *Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indië: de Nederlandsche Oostindische Compagnie in de achttiende eeuw* (Amsterdam: Uitgeversmaatschappij Joost van den Vondel, 1939), 88–90.
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- ⁶⁷ ANRI Arsip Ternate no. 62, Positive Ordres: Ternate, 20 November 1637–27 February 1739, Afgesanten, 8.
- ⁶⁸ Godée Molsbergen, *Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indië*, vol. 4, 91.
- ⁶⁹ *Generale Missiven*, vol. 9, 528. It was laden with 132 staven iron as well as some textiles to be traded with Maguindanao wax. NA VOC 8619 Makassar, 88.
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